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A B S T R A C T
Testing the reliability of experts should be a key element of
expert interviews. Using the Condorcet Jury Theorem, it is
shown that expert reliability can provide an indication of the
validity of expert-opinion data. The theoretical framework is
applied to expert-interview data collected in the Domestic
Structures and European Integration (DOSEI) project.
Special attention is paid to the role of ‘leading’ experts and
salient issues. Evaluating the DOSEI data, the main findings
are that (i) with some exceptions, there are acceptable levels
of inter-expert agreement, (ii) whether the leading expert is
included or not does not make a large difference to expert
agreement, and (iii) experts are more in agreement on
salient issues.
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Introduction
When asking for directions, is it better to ask one or several persons? If they
happen to agree, one may feel more confident. Then again, what to do if they
give differing (possibly even conflicting) advice? If one comes across a police
officer or taxi driver, then it is probably best simply to follow their instruc-
tions. Authoritative guidance carries even more weight when asking the way
for a less obvious landmark – for example, a particular street rather than a
central station.
Likewise, we need to evaluate the validity and reliability of the infor-
mation provided by the interviewees in survey research and expert inter-
views. In mass surveys we collect a large number of data points, but we may
doubt the quality of the individual responses because the interviewees are
generally poorly informed and motivated. In contrast, experts should be
better informed and more motivated, but we generally rely on only a few
data points. At the same time, we may suspect that not all of our experts are
equally knowledgeable and, of course, even experts occasionally make
mistakes.
In this article, we address these long-standing issues as they apply specifi-
cally to expert-opinion data collected in the Domestic Structures and
European Integration (DOSEI) project. The DOSEI project aims to determine
the position of the EU members (plus the Commission and European Parlia-
ment) on the draft Constitution for the European Union. As part of the DOSEI
project, country experts were asked to assess the national position on the draft
Constitution. A total of 77 experts were interviewed, varying from one to six
experts for any particular political actor.
Our first research question is how coherent the experts are in identifying
the policy positions. The DOSEI expert interviews contain two – rather
unusual – features that are especially useful for our research purposes. First
of all, the interviewers were asked to provide a personal assessment of the
quality of the various experts. As with asking for directions, face-value
validity often depends on intangibles such as body language or the provision
of additional, not directly relevant, details. On the basis of this additional
information, DOSEI identified a ‘leading expert’ for each country.
A further research question is whether we can corroborate the quality of
the ‘leading expert’ on the basis of a more objective evaluation of the answers
provided by the various experts. Is the coherence between the leading and
other experts greater than the coherence of the non-leading experts?
The second feature is that, as part of the DOSEI interviews, experts were
asked to identify the most salient issues for ‘their’ country. Our final research
question is whether the salience of an issue affects expert coherence. To use the
European Union Politics 6(3)3 1 6
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metaphor of asking directions one last time, just as it is reasonable to expect
more consistent instructions when trying to get to a prominent or generally
familiar spot, we predict higher expert coherence for more salient issues.
Expert interviews are an attractive data collection method, because they
allow researchers to bridge the divide between case studies and the compari-
son of a large number of countries based on more general and publicly avail-
able data. Further, expert interviews give the researchers control over the
dimensions that are central to the comparative research.1 Consequently, a
clear theoretical framework can be used to facilitate rigorous comparisons.
The use of expert interviews as an instrument to collect data is quite
common in political science and, in particular, in studies of the European
Union.2 Experts may provide a unique source for ‘inside’ information about
the policy-making process. In political science, experts ‘code’ information
about policy processes and political actors. They are thus comparable to
doctors diagnosing patients or coders of texts in content analysis. In medicine,
management and marketing, communication and education studies, and
linguistics, the use of multiple experts/coders and subsequent reporting of
inter-expert/coder reliability is commonplace. However, a brief survey on the
use of expert-opinion data in European Union policy studies found that the
issue of inter-expert reliability is largely ignored.
The primary research interest in this article is to evaluate the quality of
the expert-opinion data collected as part of the DOSEI project. In order to do
so, two more general questions need to be considered. First, does the
reliability of expert-opinion data provide an indication of their validity? The
Condorcet Jury Theorem is used as the theoretical framework to discuss this
issue. Second, how can we best determine the reliability of expert-opinion
data? In fact, there exists a multitude of indices for inter-rater or inter-coder
agreement. Most of the statistics available have been developed for the needs
of specific disciplines. Consequently, they reflect the requirements of a
particular discipline and their applicability to other research areas may be
limited. We will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the most commonly
used indices of inter-coder agreement: percent agreement, Cohen’s , and
Krippendorff’s . The evaluation of the DOSEI data relies on the same indices.
In the remainder of this article we first discuss various theoretical argu-
ments for the use of multiple experts to increase the validity of the data, and
consider the relation between validity and reliability. We also provide a brief
survey of the debate surrounding the various indicators for inter-coder
reliability. We conclude that there are good reasons for consulting multiple
experts, whenever possible. Moreover, it is important to report inter-expert
reliability. Even though existing indices of inter-coder reliability have their
shortcomings, they provide valuable information and are easily accessible.
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The subsequent sections evaluate the inter-coder reliability of the DOSEI data.
Special attention is paid to the role of ‘leading’ experts and salient issues. We
find that (i) with some exceptions, the inter-expert agreement in the DOSEI
data is at an acceptable level, (ii) whether the leading expert is included or
not does not make a large difference to expert agreement, and (iii) experts are
more in agreement on salient issues.
Inter-coder reliability and validity
It is important not to confuse the reliability of data and the validity of research
results based on them. Reliability sets limits to the potential validity of research
results, but reliability does not guarantee the validity of research results.
Reliability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for validity (King et
al., 1994: 24; Krippendorff, 2004b: 212–13). Nevertheless, it makes intuitive
sense to use agreement among experts as an indication of the quality of the
information they provided. The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), moreover,
provides a possible theoretical justification.3 In its most basic form, the CJT
applies to a group of individuals who independently have to make a binary
decision that is either ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, and where each individual has a fixed
probability of being right. Condorcet wanted to know the probability of the
majority being right under these assumptions.
The binomial probability formula can be used to find the answer to
Condorcet’s problem. Assume that the individual probability of being right
equals p. In a group of n individuals, the probability of a majority providing
the right answer (P) then is the sum of (n + 1)/2 to all n individuals being
right, or
(1)
If all individuals are equally competent and more likely to be right than wrong
(or p > .5), equation (1) can be applied to demonstrate the two parts of the
CJT. First, since
, (2)
it becomes extremely likely that the majority is right when the number of
individuals increases. This is known as the asymptotic part of the theorem.
The non-asymptotic part of the Jury Theorem holds that the majority is more
reliable than each individual citizen. The second part of the theorem can be
proven by showing that
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(3)
for groups of any size n (Ben-Yashar and Paroush, 2000).
For our purposes, there are two important extensions to the original CJT.
The first deals with the justification of supermajorities, and the second relaxes
the assumption of identical (or homogeneous) competence. A supermajority
voting rule requires a fraction q > (n + 1)/2 to choose an alternative. Ben-
Yashar and Paroush (2000) demonstrate that requiring a larger majority
increases the probability of a ‘right’ choice. In other words, not only does
agreement among the majority indicate that they are more likely right than
wrong, a larger majority is even more likely to be right (at least if we hold
the number of individuals constant).
The CJT has been further generalized by relaxing the assumption that all
individuals have the same level of competence. Instead we can allow for
heterogeneous levels of competence, where pi stands for the probability that
any particular individual i is right. Consequently, becomes the
average probability of a group of individuals being right. It is straightforward
to generalize the asymptotic part of the Jury Theory using average com-
petence; if .5 < p¯ < .1, and n > 2, then P > p¯ and P approaches 1 as n goes to
infinity (Owen et al., 1989).
Given varying levels of competence, it is easy to construct examples in
which the most competent individual is more competent than the majority.
Borrowing the example provided in Nurmi (2002: 52), consider a group of
three individuals with p1 = .9, p2 = .7, and p3 = .6. In this case, P = .834 and
p¯ = .73. Although the majority is still more likely to be right than the average
individual (P > p¯), the most competent individual is more competent than the
majority (p1 > P). Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000) demonstrate that the first
part of the above statement holds in general. Nitzan and Paroush (1982)
specify the condition under which the second part of the statement can occur:
given an odd number of n individuals with varying competence but for all,
pi > .5, and labelled in non-increasing order of competence, i.e. pi ≥ pj if i < j,
then the non-asymptotic part of the CJT does not hold, if
. (4)
To put it somewhat differently, suppose a jury of three individuals. The
most competent member has p1 = .9, and the other two members are equally
but less competent, or p1 > p2 = p3. In this case, the majority is less competent
than the most competent member if p2 = p3 < .75.
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The CJT is directly relevant for our main research questions. If we are
willing to accept the assumption that each expert is more likely to provide
the right rather than a wrong assessment of an actor’s policy position, then
the majority is more likely to be correct. With respect to our first research
question on the importance of expert coherence, the CJT demonstrates that,
the more the experts agree, the more likely it is that they are right, assuming
that p¯ > .5. Moreover, we can generally have more confidence in the majority
opinion if we increase the number of experts. Even if we suspect that the
experts vary in their competence, the probability of the majority of experts
being right often (but not always) exceeds the probability of the most com-
petent expert being right. With respect to our second research question, if the
‘leading’ expert is indeed more likely to be correct, she should increase the
average competence of the experts. Consequently, inclusion of the ‘leading’
expert should improve the validity of the majority agreement. Concerning
our third research question, if experts are on average more competent on
salient issues, the CJT demonstrates that the majority opinion is more likely
to be valid.
The conclusions with respect to the second and third questions can be
stated as hypotheses guiding our empirical assessment of expert coherence
in the DOSEI project.
H1: Agreement within a group of experts including the ‘leading’ expert should
be higher than that within a group excluding the ‘leading’ expert.
H2: Expert agreement on salient issues should be higher than expert agreement
on non-salient issues.
Condorcet Jury Theorem and observed agreement
In the CJT the expected probability of agreement (P) is measured by way of
equation (2), i.e. as the sum of the probabilities that a majority of individuals
– from (n + 1)/2 to n, where n > 2 – agree on the ‘right’ answer. In contrast,
inter-coder indices of agreement are based on observed agreement as a
proportion of the times coders could agree. The latter indicator of agreement
– commonly referred to as (P(A)) – differs from Condorcet agreement in three
respects: (a) P(A) evaluates agreement between pairs of experts as a
proportion of the maximum possible number of pairs that could have agreed,
(b) P(A) includes agreement on all possible categories, including ‘right’ as
well as ‘wrong’ answers, and (c) P(A) evaluates agreement for two or more
experts on two or more answer categories. Following Siegel and Castellan
(1988: 286), P(A) can be defined as:
European Union Politics 6(3)3 2 0
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, (5)
where S is the number of subjects, m the number of categories, n the number
of experts, and cij the number of experts who assign a subject i as an instance
of j.
However, if the assumptions of the CJT apply, observed agreement can be
used as an indicator of majority agreement. In terms of equation (5), the CJT
assumes that m = 2 and that the probability of each expert coding ‘right’ is
pi > .5. Consequently, the probability that two experts, i and j, independently
both code ‘right’ equals pi  pj and the probability that they both code ‘wrong’
equals (1  pi)  (1  pj). Finally, the probability of disagreement equals pi 
(1  pj)  pj  (1  pi). However, because pi, pj > .5 (by assumption), it follows
that pi  pj > (1  pi)  (1  pj) and pi  pj  (1  pi)  (1  pj) > pi  (1 
pj)  pj  (1  pi). In words, if the experts are more competent, we expect
more agreement on the ‘right’ rather than the ‘wrong’ classification, and we
expect to observe a higher proportion of pairs of experts in agreement.
It should be obvious that the assumptions about the competence of the
experts are crucial for these conclusions. If one of a pair of experts codifies at
random, pi = .5, agreement and disagreement are equally likely. Even worse,
if experts are biased towards the ‘wrong’ answer, pi < .5, we still observe more
agreement than disagreement, but this time the experts will agree on the
‘wrong’ classification. If the number of categories or alternatives increases,
the assumption that an expert is more likely to identify the ‘right’ rather than
one of the ‘wrong’ alternatives becomes less reasonable. For example, when
asking an expert to identify a position on a dimension (a subset of real
numbers), the probability that exactly the ‘right’ position is identified
approaches zero, and the probability of two experts agreeing completely is
also very close to zero. Clearly, in order for the CJT to apply, the number of
possible answer categories has to be fairly small. In the DOSEI project, the
experts were asked to identify actors’ ideal policy positions, but the actual
questions made the experts choose between two and five possible answer
categories (see Table 2 below). The assumptions of the CJT are thus reason-
able for the DOSEI data.
Measuring agreement and inferring reliability
The assessment of inter-coder reliability is a two-stage process. First, two or
more coders independently categorize the research units of interest
(patients, texts, etc.). Second, a numerical index is calculated based on the
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categorizations, quantifying the extent of agreement among the multiple
coders. Reliability is inferred from the numerical index according to its
particular assumptions. A large number of indices are available. Broadly, they
can be distinguished as either extensions of percent agreement analysis
(Holsti, 1969) or correcting the observed agreement for chance agreement
(Scott, 1955; Fleiss, 1971; Krippendorff, 2004b).
Percent agreement is a simple index that is most commonly calculated as
the percentage of all coding decisions on which the coders agree. In equation
(5) above, percent agreement is the index of observed agreement P(A). The
basic advantages of this index are that it is easy to calculate and it allows for
any number of coders. However, without any correction, percent agreement
becomes (probabilistically) increasingly more likely the fewer categories are
available for coding.
Chance-corrected agreement indices distinguish between P(A), the
observed agreement between coders, and P(E), the probability of agreement
among coders owing to chance. In general, they can all be expressed as:
. (6)
The correction for chance is important for enabling observers to judge the
reliability of the data. However, the various agreement indices differ in their
correction for chance agreement. Cohen’s κ is based on each coder’s personal
distribution (Cohen, 1960; Di Eugenio and Glass, 2004). The Krippendorff α
(as well as other indices by Scott, 1955; Fleiss, 1971; Siegel and Castellan, 1988)
assumes one distribution for all coders, which is derived from the total
proportion of categories assigned by all coders. Table 1 provides an overview
of the various chance-corrected indices for agreement.
Even though the differences between these indices have been theoreti-
cally acknowledged, in most empirical research they have been neglected –
in practice the indices produce often similar results. Moreover, as Table 1
shows, the indices converge if the number of subjects (S) grows large. Di
Eugenio and Glass (2004) notice, however, that the different computations of
P(E) have a larger effect given smaller values of κ.
There are some further limitations to the κ and α that are particularly
germane to our research purposes. Both statistics are affected by skewed
distributions of categories, or the prevalence problem, and perform best if the
data are less skewed (Di Eugenio and Glass, 2004; Krippendorff, 2004a, b).
This is especially important for nominal data, where the categories are chosen
more or less arbitrarily. Even more problematic is that Cohen’s κ is affected
by the degree to which the coders disagree (the bias problem). Actually, it is
relatively easy to show that some indices increase if the coders are less similar.4
P A P E
P E
( ) − ( )
− ( )1
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None of the chance corrections is entirely intuitive from the perspective
of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Cohen’s κ quantifies the deviation of
observed agreement from statistical independence. The Fleiss–Siegel and
Castellan κ and Krippendorff α correct observed agreement for the likelihood
that the matched observations are chance events. Based on the CJT, however,
the appropriate benchmark for expected agreement is randomness of classifi-
cation rather than statistical independence or random matching.
There is no consensus on the appropriateness of the various indices across
various disciplines. In the marketing, advertising and consumer behaviour
literature, simple percent agreement is the most commonly used index for
inter-coder reliability (Hughes and Garrett, 1990); Krippendorff’s and Holsti’s
methods of assessment follow at a distance (Kolbe and Burnett, 1991). In the
computational linguistics literature, Cohen’s  coefficient is considered the de
facto standard for inter-coder agreement despite some criticism (Carletta,
1996; Di Eugenio and Glass, 2004). The same conclusion was reached in
content analyses of news- and media-related articles (Riffe and Freitag, 1997;
Lombard et al., 2004).
Scholars disagree about what constitutes an acceptable level of reliability
in the various indices. In general, indices based solely on percent agreement
provide systematically higher values. Hence, higher critical values should be
adopted for these indices. Chance-corrected indices are considered more
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Table 1 Inter-coder agreement measures
Percent agreement (P(A))
Cohen’s κ
, where 
Fleiss–Siegel & Castellan κ
, where 
Krippendorff’s α
, where 
Note: S is the number of classifications, n is the number of raters, m is the number of categories,
cij is the number of assignments, pj1 is the marginal probability of choosing category j for rater 1.
Note that Cohen’s κ is defined only for two raters.
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conservative in their estimates and should be controlled for lower critical
values. The various chance-corrected indices (the κ and α statistics) vary in
how they are affected by skewed distribution of categories (the prevalence
problem) rather than disagreement of coders (bias problem). This makes it
nearly impossible to select critical values for reliability that apply across
indices or even across research designs (Krippendorff, 2004a: 429).
As a rule of thumb, Neuendorf (2002) proposes that, for percent agree-
ment, a coefficient of .9 or greater always indicates high reliability and a
coefficient of .8 or greater is acceptable in most situations; below that level,
acceptance or rejection depends on the nature of the study and the intentions
of the researcher. Krippendorff (2004b) considers it customary to require α ≥
.8, or, if tentative conclusions can be accepted, α ≥ .667 as the lowest conceiv-
able limit. Ultimately, the choice of an acceptable threshold for agreement
involves a subjective evaluation balancing the risks of invalid data against
losing the data completely.
Despite all these concerns, there are important areas of agreement. First
of all, in research that relies on subjective evaluation, it is important to provide
a sense of the reliability of the coders. In this respect, it is worrying that
reliability tests are rare in political science, even though content analysis and
expert interviews are commonly used. Second, the minimum requirements to
produce meaningful reliability results are the use of a representative set of
units for the testing and independent codification by all coders of the set of
units under the same conditions. Third, there is a consensus that agreement
indices based on association, correlation and consistency coefficients are
inappropriate for inferring reliability from agreement.
Coherence in the DOSEI expert interviews
We apply the various indices of inter-coder agreement to the data collected as
part of the Domestic Structures and European Integration (DOSEI) project. The
DOSEI project has used an expert survey to collect data on the positions of
the EU members (plus the Commission and European Parliament) regarding
the draft Constitution for the European Union. Country experts were asked
about the national position – the position of the government – on 24 issues
central to the draft Constitution. The survey used a total of 50 questions. Table
2 shows the distribution of the number of answer categories for the different
questions (both including and excluding sub-issues). Since the number of
answer categories is always reasonably small (never more than five possible
categories), the DOSEI data satisfy the assumptions underlying the Condorcet
Jury Theorem as well as the various inter-coder agreement indices.
European Union Politics 6(3)3 2 4
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The DOSEI project has selected the experts carefully. In the first instance,
academics were asked to identify central actors in the policy formation
process. Next, these central actors were asked to identify people they
considered most knowledgeable. The people who were mentioned most
frequently were eventually approached to serve as experts. Great care was
taken to find people who were as close as possible to the policy formation
process for the Intergovernmental Conference on the European Constitution.
Whenever several experts were approached, it was deemed important that
they occupy positions in different institutions relevant in the policy forma-
tion process. The expert interviews all took place in the autumn of 2003 as
close as possible to (but before) the Intergovernmental Conference on the
European Constitution held in December 2003.
Table 3 reveals the agreement of the experts in the DOSEI project. For
two countries (Cyprus and Greece) only one expert was interviewed, which
makes it impossible to assess any inter-expert coherence; we therefore ignore
these cases for the rest of the article. For the remaining 25 political actors, a
total of 75 experts were consulted. In 12 cases, only two experts were inter-
viewed. Information for the other 13 actors was collected using up to six
experts. Table 3 lists three indices of inter-expert agreement: percent agree-
ment, κ and α. We find that κ and α are highly correlated, but there are some
differences with respect to percent agreement.
The various indicators suggest moderate agreement among the experts
in identifying the national positions. Based on the κ and α statistics, agree-
ment is particularly poor in the case of Hungary. Percent agreement is,
however, notably higher for Hungary, although is still the lowest compared
with all other countries. Percent agreement is also notably higher than the κ
and α statistics in the cases of Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands, Latvia and
Slovenia. Inter-expert agreement is particularly strong in Luxembourg,
Germany and the EU Commission and Parliament. A comparison of expert
Dorussen, Lenz and Blavoukos Assessing the Reliability and Validity of Expert Interviews 3 2 5
Table 2 Number of answer categories per question
Number of answer Number of questions, Number of questions,
categories excluding sub-questions including sub-questions
2 4 21
3 6 8
4 6 18
5 3 3
Average 3.61 3.06
Total number of questions 19 50
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Table 3 Indicators of expert agreement in the DOSEI project
Number of Status of
experts Actor/country Abbrev. P(A) κ α actor/country
1 Cyprus CYP – – – Acceding
Greece GRE – – – EU15
2 Commission COM .92 .77 .76 EU institution
Czech Republic CZR .64 .41 .42 Acceding
Estonia EST .79 .64 .65 Acceding
France FRA .84 .69 .70 EU15
Hungary HUN .59 .20 .23 Acceding
Italy ITA .67 .52 .51 EU15
Luxembourg LUX .93 .84 .84 EU15
Malta MAL .65 .47 .44 Acceding
Poland POL .81 .61 .61 Acceding
Slovakia SLK .84 .72 .70 Acceding
Spain SPA .83 .69 .69 EU15
United Kingdom UNK .70 .49 .49 EU15
Average coherence 2 experts (n = 12) .78 .59 .59
3 Belgium BEL .92 .77 .77 EU15
Denmark DEN .85 .73 .75 EU15
Portugal POR .70 .48 .47 EU15
Sweden SWE .86 .53 .54 EU15
Average coherence 3 experts (n = 4) .83 .63 .63
4 Austria AUS .80 .57 .59 EU15
Finland FIN .82 .58 .58 EU15
Germany GER .96 .89 .88 EU15
Ireland IRE .86 .74 .74 EU15
Lithuania LIT .79 .56 .57 Acceding
Netherlands NET .76 .40 .40 EU15
Average coherence 4 experts (n = 6) .83 .62 .63
5 Latvia LAT .75 .54 .55 Acceding
Slovenia SLN .83 .56 .54 Acceding
Average coherence 5 experts (n = 2) .79 .66 .54
6 EU Parliament PAR .89 .66 .66 EU institution
Average coherence EU15 (n = 14) .82 .64 .64
Average coherence acceding (n = 9) .74 .52 .52
Average coherence COM/PAR (n = 2) .91 .71 .71
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agreement for small/medium countries with large countries (France,
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) shows that agreement is somewhat
higher for the latter than the former (average α’s are .64 versus .58). The result
remains constant if Spain and Poland are considered large countries as well.5
On average, inter-expert coherence in the original members of the
European Union (EU15) is higher than in the acceding countries. The uneven
distribution of EU15 and acceding countries with respect to the number of
experts consulted makes it difficult to assess the effect of the number of
experts on their coherence. Pearson correlations between the number of
experts and the various indices for inter-expert coherence were all highly
insignificant. Correlation between the number of experts and percent agree-
ment was .29 (significance level: .16), with κ: .06 (significance level: .78) and
α: .06 (significance level: .77).
Clearly, the identity of the actor matters more for expert coherence than
the number of experts. As one would expect, experts are more in agreement
if an actor has well-defined – and well-publicized – opinions on EU issues.
The strong coherence of the experts in their evaluation of the policy positions
of the European institutions is thus rather unsurprising. The rather poor
coherence of the experts in some of the acceding countries resembles the
opinion of the citizens in these countries that they are poorly informed about
the EU draft Constitution (Flash Eurobarometer, 2004: 3–5). The same even
applies to some of the original EU members. For example, expert coherence
is remarkably low in the Netherlands, but mirrors the fact that less than a
quarter of Dutch citizens feel well informed about the EU Constitution. We
do not want to imply a causal link between public awareness and expert
knowledge. It is more likely that the lack of a clear stance on several issues
in some countries resulted in low agreement among experts and a perceived
lack of information among the general public.
‘Leading’ experts and expert coherence
Obviously, researchers may question the validity of (some of) the answers
provided even when experts are chosen with great care. Confidence in an
expert may be based on the position or reputation of the expert, or simply on
his or her behaviour during the interview. In the DOSEI project, the inter-
viewers were asked to provide a personal assessment of the ‘quality’ of the
various experts, and a ‘leading’ expert was identified for each country/actor.6
We are, first of all, interested in whether ‘leading’ experts do indeed improve
the consistency of the experts. In other words, are the other experts more
likely to agree with the ‘leading’ expert than among themselves? It is,
however, also interesting to see whether the ‘objective’ information on expert
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coherence suggests the same expert as ‘leading’ as does interviewers’
intuition.
In Figures 1, 2 and 3, we compare the inter-expert coherence (using P(A),
κ and α) including and excluding the ‘leading’ experts. Obviously, in order
to calculate expert coherence without the ‘leading’ expert, we need to have
at least three experts initially. Consequently, for this part of the analysis, we
had to ignore the 12 cases with only two experts – 14 including Greece and
Cyprus, where only one expert was interviewed.
The first conclusion has to be that the ‘leading’ expert does not necess-
arily increase inter-expert coherence. In somewhat more than half of the 13
remaining cases, coherence including the ‘leading’ expert is about equal to or
European Union Politics 6(3)3 2 8
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slightly above inter-expert coherence with the ‘leading’ expert excluded. In 5
cases, the non-leading experts notably deviate from the ‘leading’ expert.
Excluding the ‘leading’ expert clearly lowers expert coherence in three cases:
Denmark, Austria and Ireland. In the Swedish and Portuguese cases, coher-
ence among the non-leading experts is quite a bit higher than the inter-expert
coherence including the ‘leading’ expert. By coincidence, we personally
conducted the interviews in Sweden and Portugal. We remain confident that
the ‘leading’ expert was best positioned to have access to high-quality infor-
mation. One possibility is that the non-leading experts agreed on incorrect
positions. It would be more worrying if the ‘leading’ expert misrepresented
policy positions for strategic reasons (on how strategic behaviour undermines
the Condorcet Jury Theorem, see Austin-Smith and Banks, 1996).
The results presented in Table 4 largely confirm this pattern. Using the α
statistic, we have calculated the average of the pair-wise agreement of each
expert with the others. This allows us to compare the average pair-wise agree-
ment of the ‘leading’ expert (with the other experts) with that of each of the
non-leading experts (with the other experts, including the ‘leading’ expert).
Of course, this is only possible if three or more experts were originally
consulted. The somewhat remarkable finding is that in only about half of all
cases was the ‘leading’ expert most in agreement with the other experts. In
seven cases, there was more agreement with one of the non-leading experts
– most strongly in Portugal, the Netherlands and Lithuania.
The overall finding is that the ‘leading’ expert has only a minor impact
on inter-expert coherence. Thus, there is little support for Hypothesis 1 that
there is most agreement with the ‘leading’ expert. In only three cases does
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the exclusion of the ‘leading’ expert conform to the prediction of the Hypoth-
esis 1 of decreased coherence. Moreover, the analysis of pair-wise coherence
shows most agreement with the ‘leading’ expert in only about half of all cases.
Issue-salience and expert coherence
As the final question of the interview, the experts were asked to identify the
key issues for their actor in the Intergovernmental Conference on the
European Constitution. This question allows us to determine what the most
salient issues are, at least according to the experts. Table 5 simply lists the
proportion of issues that were considered ‘salient’. The proportion of salient
issues ranges from about one-tenth (Belgium) to approximately one-third
(France and Germany). Comparing the original EU15 with the acceding states
or the European institutions, we find only small differences in the average
proportion of salient issues.
The expectation is to find higher inter-expert coherence for the salient
issues (Hypothesis 2). In Figures 4 and 5, we compare the percent agreement
and Krippendorff α values for the salient issues with the original α’s (Table
3 and Figures 1 and 3).7 In strong support of Hypothesis 2, inter-expert coher-
ence is indeed higher for the salient issue in 20 of the 25 cases; in 14 cases, it
European Union Politics 6(3)3 3 0
Table 4 Comparison of average pair-wise agreement between each expert and all
other experts (Krippendorff α)
Leading 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
Country Abbrev. expert expert expert expert expert expert
Portugal POR .49 .68 .63
Sweden SWE .51 .59 .56
Belgium BEL .75 .78 .76
Denmark DEN .76 .75 .55
Netherlands NET .39 .47 .44 .35
Lithuania LIT .54 .65 .54 .51
Finland FIN .58 .61 .61 .53
Austria AUS .61 .60 .59 .43
Ireland IRE .82 .79 .77 .62
Germany GER .90 .91 .91 .86
Latvia LAT .59 .56 .55 .52 .41
Slovenia SLN .66 .59 .57 .55 .53
Parliament PAR .73 .71 .69 .68 .66 .53
Notes: 2nd to 6th experts are listed in decreasing order. Highest average pair-wise coherences are
underlined. Only countries with three or more experts are listed.
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is substantially higher. In 5 cases, the coherence is slightly lower for the salient
issues, but generally only marginally so. We find notably lower expert coher-
ence for the salient issues only in Poland and Belgium. These two countries
also have the lowest proportion of salient issues. In the case of Poland, the
government position on some of the key issues, in particular the distribution
of vote shares, had been widely discussed and publicized. It is thus
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Table 5 Prevalence of salient issues in EU member states
Key issues as % of total
Country Abbrev. number of issues
Belgium BEL 10.00
Italy ITA 17.14
Netherlands NET 17.14
Spain SPA 17.14
Portugal POR 18.57
Austria AUS 20.00
United Kingdom UNK 20.00
Denmark DEN 22.86
Finland FIN 24.29
Luxembourg LUX 27.14
Sweden SWE 27.14
Ireland IRE 31.43
France FRA 32.86
Germany GER 34.29
Average EU15 (n = 14) 22.86
Poland POL 12.86
Malta MAL 14.29
Lithuania LIT 15.71
Czech Republic CZR 18.57
Latvia LAT 18.57
Slovenia SLN 20.00
Hungary HUN 21.43
Slovakia SLK 27.14
Estonia EST 31.43
Average acceding (n = 9) 20.00
Parliament PAR 20.00
Commission COM 25.71
Average EU institution (n = 2) 22.86
Notes: Greece and Cyprus excluded. An issue is considered salient if at least one expert mentions
the issue as a key issue.
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especially surprising to find the experts disagreeing on these highly salient
issues. A tentative explanation could be that the experts disagreed about
whether the Polish government acted sincerely or strategically with respect
to the salient issues.
More generally, we find a significant and positive correlation between
the proportion of salient issues and inter-expert coherence. The correlation
between proportion of salient issues and percent agreement is .42 (signifi-
cance level: .04). The correlation with the α for all issues equals .44 (signifi-
cance level: .03). Limiting ourselves to the salient issues, the correlation with
percent agreement becomes .43 (significance level: .03), and the correlation
with the α is .56 (significance level: .004). If, for a given political actor, more
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issues are salient, the experts are more in agreement. This holds not only
for the salient issues but for all issues. If the European Constitution is
considered more important in general (and not just for a few specific issues),
there is more agreement among the experts about the national policy posi-
tions.
Conclusion
The DOSEI project shows that expert interview is an attractive data collec-
tion method, which has allowed the project to collect a wealth of (highly
timely) information on all the relevant policy positions of all the main actors
with respect to the draft European Constitution. However, rather obviously,
the validity of the information collected by means of expert interviews
crucially depends on the quality of the experts. By considering the reliability
of the experts in the DOSEI project, we have applied these ideas in a politi-
cal framework. A second, but equally important, objective has been to
evaluate the quality of the DOSEI data.
Any theoretical link between the reliability and validity of data cannot
simply be assumed. However, the Condorcet Jury Theorem can be used to
argue for the existence of such a link. More coherent, i.e. reliable, experts are
also more likely to be right, i.e. provide valid information, under some quite
general and reasonable assumptions. The Condorcet Jury Theorem does not
require all experts to be equally knowledgeable and they may be better
informed on some issues rather than others.
Even though – or perhaps precisely because – a wide variety of indices
exist for inter-coder reliability, there is no agreement about what is the ‘best’,
most generally applicable statistic. Moreover, none of the existing indices is
especially designed to evaluate the reliability of multiple experts. To provide
an example, it is typical in content analysis that a small number of coders
evaluate a large number of units (texts/sentences) on a small number of
characteristics. In contrast, in political science, typically, a large number of
experts (but only a few for each country) evaluate a small number of units
(political actors) on a large number of characteristics (policy positions). It has
been beyond the scope of this article to devise reliability tests that are most
appropriate for expert interviews. Instead, we have presented the results for
the most commonly used indices of inter-coder reliability.
In most cases, the levels of inter-expert agreement are acceptable, given
the above-mentioned limitations. Generally, expert agreement approaches or
meets the criteria set for the κ and α statistics. There are no large differences
in expert agreement depending on the inclusion or exclusion of the ‘leading’
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experts. Experts are clearly more in agreement on salient issues. If more issues
are considered to be salient for a particular country, the experts are more in
agreement about the country’s national position on all issues.
High-quality data are essential for empirical research. Not even the most
sophisticated estimation procedure can yield valid conclusions on the bases
of seriously flawed data. In principle, expert interviews can be used to collect
data of high quality, but only if the experts are willing to go along. The
reliability of expert data should thus be checked as a matter of routine. Even
though reliability does not guarantee validity, it makes it more likely that a
valid conclusion will be reached. At the same time, reliability should not be
pursued at all costs: there is always a possibility that one expert is ‘right’ and
all others are simply ‘wrong’.
Notes
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the DOSEI Measurement confer-
ence, Speyer, 13 June 2004. We thank all participants for their helpful comments.
Further, we thank the research assistants in the DOSEI project for their work on
collecting and compiling the data. Finally, we are especially grateful to Professor
Klaus Krippendorff for advising us on the use and interpretation of his α statistic.
1 Methodological and practical issues of expert interviews as data collection
method are discussed in Richards (1996), Devine (2002: 197–215) and
Burnham et al. (2004: 205–20).
2 For examples of comparative studies using expert interviews, see Bueno de
Mesquita and Stokman (1994), Hooghe (1999), Bailer (2004) and Arregui et
al. (2004). The use of expert interviews in EU policy-specific studies is
commonplace; for examples of landmark studies, see Moravcsik (1998) and
Dyson and Featherstone (1999).
3 The Jury Theorem can be traced back to the work of Condorcet (1785) and
was ‘rediscovered’ by Black (1958); see also Grofman et al. (1983). Nurmi
(2002: 49–59) provides a concise summary and discussion of recent research
on the Condorcet Jury Theorem.
4 Di Eugenio and Glass (2004: 5) demonstrate that this applies to the Cohen’s
κ but not to the Fleiss–Siegel and Castellan extensions of the κ. We therefore
report only the latter κ’s. We further report and compare the κ with percent
agreement and Krippendorff α.
5 The distributions of κ and α can be calculated only under limited conditions
that, unfortunately, do not apply to our data. Consequently, we were unable
to test whether the differences between the indices are statistically significant.
6 Given the complexity of the negotiations on the European constitutional
Treaty and thus the questionnaire, a possible shortcoming of this approach
was that there may not have been one single ‘leading’ expert. Instead, the
quality of the information provided by the various experts may have
depended on the specific issue area.
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7 The results for the κ statistic are nearly identical and are available on request
from the authors.
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